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Ve ro ni ca Ro dri guez-Blan co ex plo ra con mi nu cio si dad en su de ta lla do e
im por tan te ar tícu lo, “Rea sons in Action v Trig ge ring Rea sons: A Reply to
Enoch on Rea son-Gi ving and Le gal Nor ma ti vity”, la na tu ra le za del otor -
ga mien to de ra zo nes, en aras de cues tio nar el in flu yen te tra ba jo re cien te
de Da vid Enoch so bre el otor ga mien to de ra zo nes y el de re cho. Si bien el
ar tícu lo de Ro driguez-Blan co cons ti tu ye una im por tan te con tri bu ción a
la li te ra tu ra en cuan to a la me jor com pren sión del otor ga mien to de ra zo -
nes y la ra zón prác ti ca, no está cla ro si el en fo que ha cia las ra zo nes para 
la ac ción, re for ma do so bre la lí nea de lo que su gie re Ro drí guez-Blan co,
cla ri fi ca ría la cues tión pri mor dial de la que se ocu pa: la ma ne ra en que
los sis te mas ju rí di cos en ge ne ral o las nor mas ju rí di cas in di vi dua les le
dan (o no) a los ciu da da nos ra zo nes para la ac ción. La cues tión so bre si
te ne mos una obli ga ción mo ral (pre sun ti va) ge ne ral de ac tuar (o de abs te -
ner se de ac tuar) tal como lo dis po nen las nor mas de pen de en gran me di -
da de si hay bue nos ar gu men tos en con tra de un en fo que in di vi dua lis ta
y ca suís ti co para res pon der a ta les nor mas.
Pa la bras cla ve:
Ra zón prác ti ca, nor mas y ra zo nes, obli ga ción mo ral de obe de -
cer el de re cho, nor ma ti vi dad del de re cho.
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PROBLEMA
Anua rio de Fi lo so fía
y Teo ría del De re cho 7
1 Fred er ick W. Thomas Pro fes sor of Law and Phi los o phy, Uni ver sity of
Min ne sota. I am grate ful for the com ments and sug ges tions of Wil liam A.
Edmundson.
Abstract:
In Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco’s thought ful and im por tant ar ti cle, “Rea sons
in Ac tion v Trig ger ing Rea sons: A Re ply to Enoch on Rea son-Giv ing and Le -
gal Normativity,” she ex plores with great care the na ture of rea son-giv ing,
in con nec tion with chal leng ing Da vid Enoch’s in flu en tial re cent work on
rea son-giv ing and the law. While Ro dri guez-Blanco’s ar ti cle makes an im -
por tant con tri bu tion to the lit er a ture on the best un der stand ing of rea -
son-giv ing and prac ti cal rea son ing, it is not clear that an ap proach to rea -
sons for ac tion re formed along the lines Ro dri guez-Blanco sug gests would
change or clar ify the ul ti mate ques tion on which she fo cuses: the way in
which le gal sys tems in gen eral or in di vid ual le gal norms do (or do not) give
cit i zens rea sons for ac tion. The ques tion of whether we have a gen eral (pre -
sump tive) moral ob li ga tion to act (or re frain from act ing) as le gal norms di -
rect us de pends to a sig nif i cant de gree on whether there are good ar gu -
ments against an in di vid u al is tic, case by case, ap proach to re spond ing to
such norms.
Key words:
Prac ti cal Rea son, Norms and Rea sons, Moral Ob li ga tion to Obey 
the Law, Normativity of Law.
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SUMMARY: In tro duc tion. I. Ex plain ing the Normativity of Law.
II. The ory (The o ries) of Rea sons for Ac tion. III. Law 
and Rea son-Giv ing. Con clu sion.
INTRODUCTION
In Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco’s thought ful and im por tant
ar ti cle, “Rea sons in Ac tion v Trig ger ing Rea sons: A Re ply to
Enoch on Rea son-Giv ing and Le gal Normativity”,2 she ex -
plores with great care the na ture of rea son-giv ing, in con -
nec tion with chal leng ing Da vid Enoch’s in flu en tial re cent
work on rea son-giv ing and the law.3
In this re sponse, I will fo cus pri mar ily on the back ground 
is sue that cre ates the con text for the de bate be tween Ro dri -
guez-Blanco and Enoch: the “prob lem of normativity” in
law, the ques tion of whether, when, and how le gal norms
cre ate rea sons for ac tions for cit i zens. In what fol lows, Part
I ex plores what com men ta tors means when they state that
there is a prob lem re gard ing “the normativity of law” that
needs ex pla na tion. Af ter a brief dis cus sion in Part II of
some dif fi cul ties in the o ries about rea sons for ac tion, Part
III con sid ers bar ri ers to the con clu sion that le gal norms
always give us reasons for action.
29
LAW AND REASONS
2 All ref er ences to “Rea sons in Ac tion v Trig ger ing Rea sons” will be
given as [manu script] page num bers in pa ren the ses. Ref er ences to other
works will be in foot notes.
3 Da vid Enoch, “Rea son-giv ing and the Law”, in Ox ford Stud ies in Phi -
los o phy of Law, vol. 1 (Lesley Green & Brian Leiter, eds., Ox ford, Ox ford
Uni ver sity Press, 2011), pp. 1-38, text also avail able at http://law.huji.
ac.il/up load/Rea son-Giv ing_and_the_Law.pdf.; see also Da vid Enoch,
“Giv ing Prac ti cal Rea sons”, Phi los o phers’ Im print, vol. 11(4) (March 2011),
www.philosophersimprint.org/011004/.
   As Ro dri guez-Blanco points out, I have re lied on Enoch’s work in two of
my re cent works: “The Na ture of Law and Rea sons for Ac tion”, Problema.
Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, No. 5, 2011, pp. 399-415, and
“Law, Plans, and Rea sons for Ac tion” (re view of Scott Shapiro, Le gal ity),
Eth ics, vol. 122, pp. 444-448 (2012).
I. EXPLAINING THE NORMATIVITY OF LAW
Ro dri guez-Blanco in tro duces her pa per by in form ing us
that “[t]he prob lem of how le gal rules or di rec tives give us
rea sons for ac tion is the cen tral prob lem of what has been
called the ‘normativity of law’” (man at p. 1, foot note omit -
ted). It is im por tant to be as pre cise about this as Ro dri -
guez-Blanco is. In other dis cus sions about “ex plain ing” “the 
normativity of law,” there of ten seems to be an as sump tion
that all le gal sys tems —or at least all “gen er ally just” le gal
sys tems— give us rea sons for ac tion all the time.4
It is well known that the “nor ma tive na ture of law” is cen -
tral, in dif fer ent ways, to many of the most im por tant mod -
ern ju ris pru den tial ap proaches to law, for ex am ple, those of 
H. L. A. Hart and Hans Kelsen.5 The o rists have em pha sized
that one can not prop erly un der stand law with out fo cus ing
on the way that it pur ports to pre scribe cit i zens’ be hav ior.
How ever, to have that as one’s start ing point that law (or
“norms from gen er ally just le gal sys tems”) al ways gives cit i -
zens rea sons for ac tion would be to beg a highly con tro ver -
sial ques tion —the ques tion of un der what cir cum stances
(and how fre quently) le gal sys tems and le gal norms in fact
give us rea sons for ac tion—. As Ro dri guez-Blanco points
out, there is al ways a dan ger in as sum ing what is still to be 
proven. While I do not agree with her ac cu sa tion that
Enoch de vel oped his the ory about rea son-giv ing to fit his
pre ferred the ory about the na ture of law (p. 3), I do not
doubt that there are am ple ex am ples of the o rists in this




4 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, “Le gal Pos i tiv ism”, in
Den nis Patterson (ed.), A Com pan ion to Phi los o phy of Law and Le gal The -
ory (2nd ed., Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 228-248.
5 See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, The Con cept of Law (2nd ed., Ox ford, 1994);
Hans Kelsen, In tro duc tion to the Prob lems of Le gal The ory (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stan ley Paulson, trans., Ox ford, 1992).
Of course, speak ing of “law’s normativity” need not en tail
a view that le gal sys tems (or gen er ally just le gal sys tems, or 
gen er ally just le gal norms) al ways give rea sons for ac tion,
or even that they only pre sump tively do so. It would suf fice
that some le gal sys tems —or just some le gal norms— on
some oc ca sions give (some) in di vid u als rea sons for ac tion.
And one can take that start ing point with out fall ing into
what Fred er ick Schauer con sid ers to be a dis tinc tive mis -
take of mod ern le gal pos i tiv ism: as sum ing that law is au -
thor i ta tive and that the Hartian “in ter nal point of view”6
(the per spec tive of ac tors who be lieve that law gives them
rea sons for ac tion) should be given pri or ity in le gal the ory.7
As we shall see, though, even the as ser tion that law
some times gives some peo ple rea sons for ac tion re quires
clar i fi ca tion be fore one gets to ex pla na tion. For there are al -
ter na tive “sub jec tive” and “ob jec tive” ways of un der stand ing 
the giv ing of rea sons, as will be dis cussed in the next sec -
tion. That some peo ple might act (or re frain from act ing) in
a par tic u lar way, in this case, con sis tently with what le gal
norms pre scribe, may call for a psy cho log i cal ex pla na tion
rather than a philo soph i cal one (just as one’s won der re -
gard ing why peo ple treat the choices, ac tions, or com ments
of ce leb ri ties as rea sons for ac tion would be in the arena of
psy chol ogy and so ci ol ogy rather than phi los o phy).8 Our
ques tion is clearly more on the ob jec tive side of the ques -
tion: why peo ple jus ti fi ably should (at least on some oc ca -
sions) treat le gal rules as reasons for action; this question
calls for a philosophical explanation.
Ad di tion ally, even if one grants or as sumes that rea -
son-giv ing by law is only “spo radic” (ap ply ing only to some
le gal norms and some peo ple on some oc ca sions), this rea -
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6 See Hart, The Con cept of Law, su pra note 5, pp. 79-91.
7 See, e.g., Fred er ick Schauer, “Pos i tiv ism Through Thick and Thin”,
in Brian Bix (ed.), An a lyz ing Law (Ox ford, 1998), pp. 65-78, at pp. 70-78.
8 Ro dri guez-Blanco does make a fa vor able, if pass ing, ref er ence to
“moral psy chol ogy” (p. 24); how ever, psy chol ogy, moral or oth er wise, is
not a topic on which I am qual i fied to com ment.
son-giv ing can still seem to be, in some senses, mys te ri ous. 
How or in what way can the ac tions of of fi cials (by vot ing
for leg is la tion, de ci sion le gal dis putes in the courts, or pro -
mul gat ing ad min is tra tive reg u la tions) cre ate for cit i zens
rea sons for ac tion that they did not have be fore? The works 
of both Kelsen and Hart dis play puz zle ment on this is sue, a 
puz zle ment in creased by their be lief that law should be un -
der stood as some thing con cep tu ally sep a rate from mo ral ity. 
Both Kelsen and Hart seem to find re course in a (not en -
tirely per sua sive) be lief that law cre ates its own sort of
normativity, much as a game does (chess rea sons for ac tion 
ap ply only to those who choose to play chess; could le gal
rea sons be sim i larly au ton o mous?).9 How ever, Kelsen and
Hart, and their views of le gal normativity, are top ics for an -
other day;10 we need to return to the debate between
Rodriguez-Blanco and Enoch.
II. THEORY (THEORIES) OF REASONS FOR ACTION
In her ar ti cle, Ro dri guez-Blanco of fers a use ful over view of
the o ries about rea sons for ac tion, di vid ing them into three
cat e go ries: normativist ap proaches —to which she gives the
most at ten tion, in part be cause this is the cat e gory to which
she as signs Enoch’s work—; Humean ap proaches, which
she seems to dis miss quickly; and ap proaches that con nect
rea sons to the struc ture of in ten tions.
There are ob vi ous dif fi cul ties in of fer ing a gen eral anal y -
sis of rea sons for ac tion, as it is hard to ac count si mul ta -
32
BRIAN H. BIX
9 Cf. Andrei Marmor, Law in the Age of Plu ral ism (Ox ford, 2007), pp.
153-181 (“How Law is Like Chess”).
10 I also leave for oth ers or for an other day the im por tant ques tion of
the pre cise way in which le gal norms af fect (or should af fect) our rea sons:
do they merely pro duce rea sons that are stron ger than other (e.g. pru den -
tial) rea sons, or do they work to ex clude or pre-empt other rea sons? See,
e.g., Jo seph Raz, Prac ti cal Rea son and Norms (Prince ton, 1990); Noam
Gur, “Nor ma tive Weigh ing and Le gal Guid ance of Con duct”, Ca na dian
Jour nal of Law and Ju ris pru dence, vol. 25, pp. 359-391 (2012).
neously for the ob jec tive as pect of rea sons for ac tion (what I 
ac tu ally have rea son to do), the sub jec tive as pect (what I
think I have rea son to do), and the per sis tence of guid ance.
As we are fal li ble rea son ers, and cer tainly fal li ble moral rea -
son ers, what we think we have rea sons to do fre quently di -
verges from what we ac tu ally have rea sons to do. It may be
that, in the end, no sin gle the ory can ac count for all as -
pects of rea sons for ac tion, just as it may be the case that
no the ory of the na ture of law can ac count both for its quite 
dif fer ent as pects – e.g., its role in prac ti cal reasoning and
its status as a kind of social institution.
Ro dri guez-Blanco does an ex cel lent job of point ing out
dif fi cul ties that most normativist ap proaches will have, in -
clud ing some that may be dis tinc tive to Enoch’s the ory of
rea son-giv ing. One might only note that it would seem
likely that al ter na tive ap proaches (Ro dri guez-Blanco hints
at her pre ferred ap proach in this brief ar ti cle, but does not
fully dis play its out lines and jus ti fi ca tions) might have the
mir ror prob lem – to be weak ex plain ing just those as pects
of rea son-giv ing where normativist the o ries are strong. I
leave to oth ers more ex pert in this area to of fer fi nal judg -
ments on whether a the ory can ad e quately respond to all
aspects of practical reasoning.
III. LAW AND REASON-GIVING
While the In tro duc tion of Ro dri guez-Blanco’s pa per be -
gins by re fer ring to the “prob lem of how le gal rules or di rec -
tives gives us rea sons for ac tion” and the “cen tral ques tion
of le gal normativity” (p. 1), law soon largely drops out of the 
dis cus sion.11 She re turns to the topic, in a tan ta liz ing way,
near the end of her cri tique of Enoch’s approach:
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11 Again, with the ex cep tion of Ro dri guez-Blanco’s ac cu sa tion, in pass -
ing, that Da vid Enoch had al lowed his the ory of rea sons for ac tion to be
de rived from or de ter mined by his “own fa voured the ory of law” (p. 3).
It is triv i ally true to say that if we un der stand the phe nom e -
non of rea son-giv ing then we pave the way to better un der -
stand ing how le gal di rec tives and rules give us rea sons for
ac tions… [W]e need to fo cus fur ther on the phe nom en ol ogy
of le gal di rec tives, com mands and rule-fol low ing in light of
moral psy chol ogy and phi los o phy of ac tion to achieve a
sound the ory of what le gal normativity amounts to in terms
of how le gal di rec tive and le gal rules provide reasons for
action (pp. 23-24).
There will be more on Ro dri guez-Blanco’s ideas about
normativity later in this sec tion; for now, I would like to re -
turn to the “law” as pect of the topic, if for no other or better 
rea son than that I am more com fort able an a lyz ing the o ries
about the na ture of law than I am an a lyz ing the o ries about
rea sons and reasoning.
Those who ar gue that law gives —or at least that gen er ally 
just le gal sys tems or the le gal norms of gen er ally just le gal
sys tems give— prima fa cie rea sons for ac tion have a dif fi cult
task. They must show that (all or some cat e gory of) le gal
norms al ways give rea sons to act in com pli ance. Of course,
the ar gu ment does not have to be that such rea sons are
con clu sive; it is suf fi cient that the le gal norms give weight in 
fa vor of a par tic u lar ac tion or for bear ance, even if fac tors un -
re lated to the le gal norm in ques tion might cre ate stron ger
rea sons against that ac tion or for bear ance (as when one
right fully vi o lates le gal rules about max i mum driv ing speeds
to rush a se ri ously in jured friend to the hos pi tal).
Da vid Enoch’s ul ti mate po si tion, echo ing that of Jo seph
Raz, M. B. E. Smith, and many oth ers, is that le gal norms
some times give peo ple rea sons for ac tion, but the mat ter is
con tin gent, de pend ing on the norm, the sub ject-mat ter,
and the ac tor.12 This re flects a pre sump tive in di vid u al ism
in moral de ci sion-mak ing: that pre sump tively each per son
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12 See Enoch, su pra note 3, at 14-33; Jo seph Raz, Eth ics in the Pub lic
Do main (Ox ford, 1994), pp. 325-338; M. B. E. Smith, “Is There a Prima Fa -
cie Ob li ga tion to Obey the Law?”, Yale Law Jour nal, vol. 82, pp. 950-976
(1973).
should de cide how to act for her self, and case by case, un -
less and un til a good rea son is given to de fer to oth ers or to
decide on a categorical basis.
Those who wish to ar gue that all the norms of (some) le gal 
sys tems cre ate rea sons for ac tion must of fer an anal y sis that 
does not turn on the con tent of par tic u lar le gal norms.13 The 
dif fi culty, as skep tics of such claims point out, is that with
many (if not most) le gal norms there are likely cir cum -
stances where non-com pli ance with the norm has lit tle to no 
neg a tive ef fect in the world —no harm to other peo ple or to
so ci ety gen er ally, and no un der min ing of other peo ple’s re -
spect for or sup port of the law— and in such cir cum stances
it is hard to see why we would have a rea son to com ply.
How could one re spond to this sort of cri tique? Per haps
to cre ate a gen eral or pre sump tive ob li ga tion to obey the
law, one would need to avoid an in stru men tal ap proach to
un der stand ing the ben e fits of law —for if the fo cus is on the 
ben e fits that le gal norms or the le gal sys tem as a whole are
there to cre ate, it is al ways open to the skep tic to ar gue
that the mor ally au ton o mous agent should in ves ti gate, case 
by case, whether such ben e fits are in fact achieved, and,
in ev i ta bly, there will be oc ca sions when no ben e fits are in
fact achieved by that ac tor’s com pli ance. It would ap pear to 
be the case that to de feat the skep tic one would need an ar -
gu ment that law —as a sys tem and in all of its (not ex -
tremely un just) le gal norms— has sig nif i cant in trin sic
value, and not just po ten tial in stru men tal value.14
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13 Even if one ac cepts with Gustav Radbruch (and some un der stand -
ings of Aqui nas) that ex tremely un just norms lose their sta tus as laws,
see Gustav Radbruch, “Stat u tory Law less ness and Su pra-Stat u tory Law”
(trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stan ley L. Paulson), Ox ford Jour nal
of Le gal Stud ies, vol. 26, pp. 1-11 (2006), that still leaves the prob lem of
jus ti fy ing the rea son-giv ing power of all the re main ing norms, re gard less
of their moral value, their sig nif i cance, and their suc cess in co or di nat ing
be hav ior.
14 See George Duke, “Finnis on the Au thor ity of Law and the Com mon
Good”, Le gal The ory (forth com ing) (mak ing a sim i lar ar gu ment, at greater
Ro dri guez-Blanco, in her many writ ings (both pub lished15
and un pub lished)16 seems to of fer an ap proach along these
lines, fo cus ing on the “good-mak ing char ac ter is tics of le gal
rules”.17 Un der this ap proach, the fol low ing of le gal rules
–the use of le gal rules as guid ance– is tied closely to the
goods of fi cials in tend to achieve, both through the cre ation
of a le gal sys tem, and through in di vid ual le gal norms. Ro -
dri guez-Blanco’s ar gu ment has been that law is au thor i ta -
tive be cause law pur ports to be good, and en deav ors to cre -
ate this good (or these goods) in a spe cial way (through the
rule of law).18
One can see how the po ten tial or in tended good of the le -
gal sys tem as a whole, or of par tic u lar le gal norms (or sets
of le gal norms —as in ar eas of law—), could (sub jec tively)
guide be hav ior. We are at tracted to the good in the law, and 
the good that law can achieve. We want to sup port it. Thus, 
we can ex plain why we do fol low the law, or why we do obey 
par tic u lar le gal rules. How ever, the objectivist ques tion still
co mes: when are we mor ally ob li gated to follow the law?
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length, in the con text of of fer ing a cri tique of John Finnis’s de fense of a
moral ob li ga tion to obey the law).
15 Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco, “The Moral Puz zle of Le gal Au thor ity”,
in Stefano Bertea & George Pavlakos (eds.), New Es says on the Normativity 
of Law (Ox ford: Hart Pub lish ing, 2011), pp. 86-106; Ve ron ica Ro dri -
guez-Blanco, “Claims of Le gal Au thor i ties and ‘Ex pres sions of In ten tion’:
The Lim its of Phi los o phy of Lan guage”, in Cur rent Le gal Is sues (Mi chael
Free man & Fiona Smith (eds.), forth com ing, Ox ford Uni ver sity Press,
2013); see also Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco, “So cial and Jus ti fied Le gal
Normativity: Un lock ing the Mys tery of the Re la tion ship”, Ra tio Juris, vol.
25, pp. 409-433 (2012).
16 E.g., Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco, “Le gal Rules in the Guise of the
Good” (un pub lished manu script, 2010) (on file with au thor); Ve ron ica Ro -
dri guez-Blanco, Law Un der the Guise of the Good (un pub lished book
manu script, 2010) (on file with au thor).
17 E.g., Ro dri guez-Blanco, “Le gal Rules in the Guise of the Good”, su -
pra note 16 (man. at 20).
18 E.g., Ro dri guez-Blanco, “The Moral Puz zle of Au thor ity,” su pra note
15, at 87 & n. 5. She adds that Nazi law fails to be an au thor ity be cause it
is not an in stance of au thor ity as a good sort of thing. Íd. at 101.
One can con cede that gov ern ments that try to do good
things, and do so through rule of law pro ce dural stan dards, 
are them selves good: that we have rea son to cre ate them
and sup port them while they are cre ated. As al ready dis -
cussed, how ever, it is an other mat ter to show that in di vid -
ual cit i zens have rea sons to com ply with in di vid ual le gal
norms. It is cer tainly true that for cen tu ries it had been as -
sumed that the con clu sion that a gov ern ment was le git i -
mate or that a le gal sys tem was gen er ally just would en tail
the fur ther con clu sion that cit i zens had at least a pre sump -
tive moral ob li ga tion to obey. How ever, mod ern the o rists of
the ques tion of the moral ob li ga tion to obey the law no lon -
ger as sume that one view en tails the other; they gen er ally
hold that the moral ob li ga tion to obey re quires an ad di -
tional ar gu ment.19
Cit i zens would have a rea son to com ply if non-com pli ance
would sig nif i cantly harm a gen er ally just le gal sys tem (in
Aqui nas’s phrase, “cre ate dis or der or de mor al iza tion”),20 but
that is rarely the case. With most in stances of de cid ing
whether to com ply with a le gal norm or not, no good rea son
has been of fered against the de fault po si tion: the prac ti cally
rea son able per son mak ing a prac ti cally rea son able choice,
case by case, re gard ing whether to com ply with the law or
not.
There are dif fer ent sorts of ar gu ments that might be of -
fered, and which have been of fered, to try to cre ate a global
(or global-pre sump tive) ob li ga tion to obey the law. Of ten
these run along the lines of a Kantian-style ar gu ment that
in di vid u als should not pick and choose be cause of the bad
con se quences should ev ery one ap proach le gal norms that
way.21 An other ap proach is to ar gue that prac ti cally rea son -
able peo ple, aware of their own bi ases and in ter ests, would
37
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19 See, e.g., Smith, su pra note 12, Raz, su pra note 12.
20 Thomas Aqui nas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Qu. 96, art. 4, cor pus; see
also John Finnis, Aqui nas (Ox ford, 1998), pp. 273-274.
21 An ar gu ment along these lines can be found in A. M. Honore, Mak ing 
Law Bind (Ox ford, 1987), pp. 117-138.
de fer to the le gal sys tem, be cause a le gal sys tem is a
method of dis trib ut ing bur dens and ben e fits across dif fer -
ent in di vid u als and groups; for some one to pick and choose 
is un fairly to ac cept ben e fits with out ac cept ing the cor re -
spond ing bur dens (and to ac cept law where it agrees with
their own views of what needs to be done, but not to ac cept
it when it var ies from those views, though know ing that the 
rules there fol low other cit i zens’ views about what needs to
be done).22
These are sig nif i cant ar gu ments, not to be dis missed
lightly. How ever, it seems that one might still re spond that
in the end one is left with the prac ti cally rea son able per son
who must make the moral judg ment for her self: giv ing due
def er ence based one one’s own fal li bil ity and bias (though
also keep ing in mind the fal li bil ity and bias that can, and
of ten does, af flict law mak ers), should one obey par tic u lar
le gal norms?23
CONCLUSION
Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco’s ar ti cle makes an im por tant
con tri bu tion to the lit er a ture on the best un der stand ing of
rea son-giv ing and prac ti cal rea son ing. How ever, it is not
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22 Ar gu ments along these lines can be found in John Finnis, “The Au -
thor ity of Law in the Pre dic a ment of Con tem po rary So cial The ory”, No tre
Dame Jour nal of Law Eth ics & Pub lic Pol icy, vol. 1, pp. 115-137 (1984);
John M. Finnis, “Law as Co-or di na tion”, Ra tio Juris, vol. 2, pp. 97-104
(1989).
23 Thomas Christiano has ar gued that at least for le gal norms that are
the prod uct of dem o cratic de ci sion-mak ing, a fail ure to obey the law con -
sti tutes a fail ure to give equal re spect to fel low cit i zens. See, e.g., Thomas
Christiano, “The Au thor ity of De moc racy”, Jour nal of Po lit i cal Phi los o phy,
vol. 12, pp. 266-290 (2004); Thomas Christiano, “De moc racy’s Au thor ity:
Re ply to Wall”, Jour nal of Po lit i cal Phi los o phy, vol. 14, pp. 101-110 (2006).
This ar gu ment is part of a large is sue that can not be ad e quately dis -
cussed here; for now suf fice it to say that I do not find the ar gu ment per -
sua sive. I touch on the topic in a re view of Chris to pher J. Pe ters, A Mat ter
of Dis pute (Ox ford, 2011), to ap pear in Law and Phi los o phy (forth com ing).
clear that an ap proach to rea sons for ac tion re formed along 
the lines Ro dri guez-Blanco sug gests would change or clar ify 
the ul ti mate ques tion on which she fo cuses: the way in
which le gal sys tems in gen eral or in di vid ual le gal norms do
(or do not) give cit i zens rea sons for ac tion. The ques tion of
whether we have a gen eral (pre sump tive) moral ob li ga tion
to act (or re frain from act ing) as le gal norms di rect us de -
pends to a sig nif i cant de gree on whether there are good ar -
gu ments against an in di vid u al is tic, case by case, ap proach
to re spond ing to such norms.
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